THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER.
APRIL 1878.
RAILROAD AID BONDS IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES.

TiE history of railroad bond litigation in the Federal Supreme,
Court is remarkable in more respects tlan one. That august tribunal begun by constituting itself the guardian of the peoples'
rights and of the public credit, and in administering this selfimposed trust, "it has upheld and protected the rights of such
creditors (bondholders) with a firm hand, disregarding at times, it
would seem, principles which it applied.in other cases, and asserting
the jurisdiction and authority of the Federal courts with such
striking energy and vigor, as apparently, if not actually, to trench
upon the lawful rights of the states and the acknowledged powers
of the state tribunals :" (Dillon Mun. Cori., sect. 416, page 403.)
While professing to be "not unmindful of the importance of uniformity" in its decisions, "and those of the highest local courts
giving constructions to the laws and constitutions of their own
states," and admitting "that it is the settled rule of this court in

such cases to follow the decisions of the state courts," it nevertheless claims that "there have been heretofore in the judicial history
of this court, as doubtless there will be hereafter, many exceptional cases," and adds, "we shall never -inimolate truth, justice
and the law, because a state tribunal has erected the altar and
decreed the sacrifice :" Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 206.
VOL. XXVI.-27
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Two opinions to the same point, within a few months of each
other, have recently illustrated these "exceptional cases." We
allude to Harshman v. Bates County, 2 Otto 569, and County of
Cass v. Johnson, decided at the present term of the court. .
It might be sufficient for the purpose of this article to indicate
the singular and extraordinary inconsistency of "incidentally"
holding a state law unconstitutional and afterwards holding the
exact reverse; but we will also attempt to show that the last decision does not follow the decisions of the state court on this point.
I. And first as to these township aid bond cases from the state
of 'Missouri. In the case of ffarshman v. Bates Oounty, the case
was thus: An action was brought by Harshman to recover the
amount due on certain coupons attached to bonds of Bates county,
Missouri, issued by Mount Pleasant township, in said county, in
payment of a subscription in behalf of the township, to the capital
stock of the Lexington Lake and Gulf Railroad Company. The
subscription was made'under a law of Missouri, called the Township
Aid Act, passed in 1868, by which, on the application of twentyive tax-payers and residents of any township for election purposes
in any county, the county court may order an election to be held
in such township to determine whether and on what terms a subscription to any railroad to be built in or near the township shall
be made; and if two-thirds of the qualified voters of the township
voting at such election are in favor of the subscription the county
court shall make it in behalf of the township, and if bonds are proposed to pay the subscription, the court shall issue such bonds in
the name of the county, but to be provided for by the township.
The constitution of Missouri (adopted in 1865) declares "that
the General Assembly shall not authorize any county, city or town
to become a stockholder in, or to loan its credit to, any company,
association or corporation, unless two-thirds of the qualified voters
of such county, city or town, at a regular or special election, to be
held therein, shall assent thereto." It may also be stated that subsequently to the voting of the subscription by the township, and
before the making of it by the county court in behalf of the township, the former company became consolidated with another, thereby
forming a third, to whose stock the subscription was made. It was
held by the Supreme Court of the United States, in this case, as
follows:
1. That the -' Township Aid Act" (of 1868) -was unconstitu-
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tional on the ground that it authorized a subscription if two-thirds
of the qualified voters of the township voting at each eleetion are
in favor of the subscription; whereas the constitution (of 1865)
required that two-thirds of the qualified voters of such county, city,
or town, at a regular or special election to be held therein, shall
assent thereto.
2. That the vote of the township was the vote of the county, as
being a part of it, for the purposes of a valid subscription.
3. That the authority [attempted to be] conferred by the vote of
subscription by the township remaining unexecuted at the time
of the extinction of the company [by consolidation with another]
was revoked by such extinction, and the power to subscribe [by the
county court] was extinguished.
4. As sufficient notice of these objections is contained in the recitals of the bonds themselves to put the holder on inquiry, there
was no error in the judgment -of the Circuit Court of the United
States [which was in favor of the county] and it is therefore affirmed.
It will be seen that the main ground of the decision is the unconstitutionality of the "Township Aid Act," for under the decision
the consolidation of the company was immaterial, since the holding
is that the subscription voted was invalid, because not conforming to
the requirements of the constitution, and if the original company
had remained in existence the result must necessarily have been the
same. And so the decision was construed and accepted by bench
and bar from the time of its promulgation (see Dillon's Law of Municipal Bonds, p. 44, n. 45).
The case of Cass County v. Johnson, decided at the present term,
was thus : The factq are not stated in the opinion, but it appears
that the bonds of the county were issued to a railroad company not
incorporated until the day of voting the subscription, but was so
incorporated before the issuing of the bonds by the county court,
and the questions raised were, (1) The constitutionality of the law
(Township Aid Act of 1868); (2) The non-incorporation before
the day of election; and (3) The rendering of judgment against
the county, and the manner of enforcing it, as declared by the
lower court (Circuit Court of the United States). The case of
.Harshman v. Bates County was, of course, relied on as conclusive
on the first point, i. e. the unconstitutionality of the law as to the
vote. But the court held as follows:
1. That the Township Aid Act (of 1868) is constitutional (con-
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sidering it to have been in effect so held in State v. Linn County,
44 Mo. 504, and therefore conclusive upon the question), and
overruling ffarmhvan v. Bates County, in so far as it declares the
law (i. e. said Township Aid Act of 1868) unconstitutional.
2. That the bonds sued upon are not invalid because the railroad
company to which the subscription was voted was not incorporated
until the day of the election-it being sufficient that the company
was incorporated when the subscription was made.
8. That a judgment may be rendered against the county (in case
of a subscription voted by a township of said county) to be enforced if necessary, by mandamus against the county court, or the
judges thereof, to compel the levy and collection of a tax in accordance with the provisions of the law under which the bonds were
issued. The only difference' between the two cases is that in the
last -the constitutionality of the Township Aid Act was directly
presented-and in the first case it was suggested by the court ex
mero motu and made the basis of its decision, And "incidentally"
decided to be unconstitutional, but surely not without due consideration, for this court would hardly hold a state law unconstitutional without examining the decisions of said state even upon Ian
"implied concession" to that effect.
It therefore appears clearly that the court, upon a careful and
not an "incidental" examination of the law and of the decisions
of the Supreme Court of Missouri construing it, finally came to
the decision that the Missouri court had held the law constitutional
-that this [assumed] holding was conclusive upon it (the Supreme
Court of the United States), and that the act and bond were valid.
It is proper to state that two of the ablest judges of the court
(BRADLEY

and

MILLER)

held to the contrary on these points, i. e.

they held both the legislative act and the subscription were invalid;
and also differed with the majority as to the effect of the Missouri
cases bearing on the question.
IL It will now be attempted to showi that this last decision (Cass
County v. Johnson, does not follow the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Missouri construing the law. In order to do this satisfactorily a brief review of the cases in the state court will be here
made.
There are only two cases decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri bearing directly upon the main point in Cass County v. JTOhnson, that is, to say--whether the requirements of the constitution,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE U. S.

that "two-thirds of the qualified voters of a county, city or town
* * shall assent thereto," in order to authorize a subscription by
the county court-is met by the provisions of the statute authorizing a subscription if two-thirds of the qualified voters * * voting
at such election are in favor of the subscription; and these are directly opposed to the view of the court in the case last named; and
in entire unison with the view promulgated in Har8hvzan v. Bates
County. These cases are State v. Winkelmeier, 35 Mo. 503, and
State v. Sutterfield, 54 Id. 391.
State v. Winkelmeier was thus: Winkelmeier was indicted for
selling liquor on Sunday. The evidence was that he sold beer, but
did not sell distilled liquors. The legislature of Missouri had
enacted "that the corporate authorities of the different cities in the
county of St. Louis shall have the power, whenever a majority of
the legal voters of the respective cities in said county authorize
them to do so, to grant permission for the opening of any establishment * * within the corporate limits of said cities, for the sale of
refreshments of any kind (distilled liquors excepted) on any day in
the week." In accordance with this .act, and subsequent to it, an
election was held in St. Louis, in which more than 18,000 voters
participated, and only 5035 voted in favor of giving the city authority to grant said pelfmission, and 2001 persons voted against it.
Winkelmeier relied on this supposed permission by the corporate
authorities of St. Louis as a defence to the indictment. But the
court held "that the act (of the legislature) expressly requires a
majority of the legal voters-that is, of all the legal voters of the
city, and not merely of all those who might at a particular time
choose to vote upon the question." And what is further noticeable
in this case is that in this election only 7036 votes were cast on the
question of the granting of permission under the ordinance, of which
number 5035 votes were in favor of it, and 2001 against it, showing a difference in favor of granting the permission of 3034 votes,
and much more than a majority of the votes cast on that question.
So that the court necessarily held on the facts as well as on the law
that a majority of the persons voting was not sufficient to authorize
the city authorities to grant the permission under the act of the
legislature. In the case next referred to (State v. Sutterfleld, 54
Mo. 391), this ease is expressly referred to and approved, and two
cases claimed to be inconsistent with it, and.-which are also cited in
Cass County v. Johnson, in support of that decision (Bassett v.
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The Mayor, ft., 87 Mo. 270, and State v. Binder, 88 Id. 450),
are disposed of with the remark that these cases "were upon temporary acts of legislation, in which a construction either way was
not of importance, as a subsequent legislature could readily do
away with any inconvenience which might arise from"incorrect or
unacceptable construction."
The other case above referred to (State v. Sutterfield, 54 Mo.
891) is even stronger, and should be conclusive as to the construction of the constitutional provision. The case was this: Dobbins and
three hundred other citizens of Reynolds county, Missouri, applied to
the Circuit Court of that county for a mandamus on the county justices to appoint commissioners to select a site whercon to locate the
seat of justice. To the writ, which was issued, the county court
returned that at the general election held on 5th November 1872
the proposition to remove the seat of justice of Reynolds county
from its present location did not receive "two-thirds of the legally
registered votes of Reynolds county," nor were two-thirds of the
legal votes of said county pqlled at said election, as appeared by
the returns of said registration and election ; that at a registration
held for said county, within sixty days preceding the tenth day
prior to said 5th November 1872, 694 voters legally registered in
said county, and that the proposition to change the county seat
received only 244 votes out of 694 legally registered voters, and
out of 547 actually polled at said election. There was a further
answer in the return on other points not material to be mentioned
here. This return to the writ of-mandamus made by the county
court, on motion to strike it out and disregard it, was held insufficient (by the lower, court), and a peremptory mandamus was
awarded. To this judgment a writ of error was taken. It should
also be stated that the constitution of Missouri then in force (art.
4, sect. 30) provided: "The Genera Assembly shall have no
power to remove the county seat of any county, unless two-thirds
of the qualified voters of the county, at a general election, shall
vote in favor of such removal." And the statute on the subject
(Wagner's St. 405, sect. 22), after providing for an election, enacts :
"If it shall appear by such election that two-thirds of the legally
registered voters of said county are in favor of the removal of the
county seat, then the county court shall," &c. Upon this state of
facts, and construing the constitution and statute provisions aforesaid, the Supreme Court of Missouri held as follows:'
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"It appears from the return of the county court to the mandamus,
that the registration immediately prior to the election showed that
there were iii Reynolds county 694 voters; that 547 of these duly
registered voters actually voted at the election, and only 244 voted
for the removal of the county seat, and only 47 votes were cast
against the removal. The county court decided that 244 was not
two-thirds of 694, nor of 547, and as the constitution (and also the
statute) required that two-thirds of the qualified voters should vote
for such removal, refused to appoint commissioners or proceed further in the matter. The Circuit Court held that as 244 was twothirds of 2 9 1-all the votes cast on the question of removal-the
requisite constitutional majority was obtained."
" There is no doubt," continued the court, "that in general,
where an election is held to determine the choice of a candidate,
or the determination of some question of public policy, the plurality
required by the law, whether it be a bare majority, or two-thirds,
or three-fourths, is determined by the result of the vote cast, without regard to the number of voters declining to vote ; and this is
upon the ground that the failure to vote is assumed or may be presumed to be an acquiescence in whatever result may be ptoduced
by the action of those who felt sufficient interest in the election to
go to the polls and vote; and for the further reason that, in most
cases, there is no mode by which the number of absentees can be
ascertained. The decision of Lord MANSSFIELD, in Bex v. Poxeroft,
2 Burr. 1017, is therefore rightly followed in many cases in this
country where it might properly be applied. But the decisions
in England, or in other states, are very unsafe guides when we are
called upon to construe a constitutional or statutory provision of
our own state. If the language is plain and unambigious, its
requirements cannot be set at naught upon the strength of decisions
elseyhere on statutes or constitutions essentially variant or couched
in very different terms."
Further continuing, the court says: "Our constitution, in
regard to the proposed removal of county seats, hardly admits of
two constructions. It prohibits the legislature from removing
them, unless two-thirds of the qualified voters shall, at a general
election, vote for the removal. The words do not imply an acquiescence, or a negative sanction, or a negative assent inferred from
absence, but a positive vote in the affirmative, and the number of
votes required is specifically named, and there is no difficulty in
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ascertaining what that number is, since the same constitution provides for a registration, and points out who the qualified voters are;
and the statute in this case uses the words 'legally registered
voters,' and requires two-thirds of them to vote for the change;
and the return of the county court produces the registration, and
shows that not one-half of the registered voters voted for the
change, and not one-half of the voters who voted at the election
voted for it. With what propriety then can it be said that twothirds of the qualified voters voted for the change ?"
Concluding the opinion on this point, and referring to Bassett v.
The Alayor, ft., 87 Mo. 270, and The State v. Binder, 38 Id.
450 (heretofore alluded to), which were claimed to maibtain views
conflicting with this opinion, the court says: "A reference to these
cases will show that neither of them arose on the construction of a
provision of the constitution, or on the subject-matter now under
consideration. In neither of these cases was there any examination of or construction given to the precise language of the constitutional provision now under consideration." And the judgment
of the circuit court was reversed.
It was'therefore clearly held in this case:1. That the constitution prohibits the legislature from removing
county seats, "unless two-thirds of the qualified voters shall, at a
general election, vote for the removal," and that these words do not
imply an acquiescence or a negative sanction, or a negative assent
inferred from absence, but a positive vote in the affirmative.
2. That the general rule of determining an election by the
result of the vote cast, applicable to the choice of a candidate or
the determination of some question of public policy, does not apply
in construing a constitutional or statutory provision whose language
is plain and unambiguous.
8. That (applying these principles to the facts of this case) a
vote of two-thirds voting on the question-not being two-thirds
of the qualified voters-does not conform to the constitutional
requirement.
It also appears that this case differs from Cass Co. v. Johnson
in only one thing; that is to say, in this case the statute was in
conformity to the constitution, and in the Cass county case the
statute was inconsistent with and in disregard of the constitution.
It also appears that the cases are precisely analogous in principle,
and that if the Supreme Court of the United States had followed
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the decision of the state court, as it professed to do, its judgment
must have been the opposite of the one rendered. And it cannot
be claimed that the decisions of other states, or of the Supreme
Court of the United States itself, on the general subject of the
construction of, election laws, either constitutional or statutory,
should have any weight, or even be considered in this case, or
treated as relevant to it, since it is expressly admitted by that
court, "that the decisions of this state construing their own law are
conclusive upon us."
Not one of the Missouri cases cited by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Cass County v. ohnson supports it in the
position assumed as to the construction of the constitution and
statute in question before the court. They are all cases either of
temporary legislation or of construction of other constitutional
provisions, or at least passing upon different grounds of objection
than this, and in none of them was the constitutional question here
raised in issue, or, as far as appears, considered by the court. It is
true that this "Township Aid Act" was treated as constitutional,
as all laws are in thb absence of objection legally interposed, until
the Supreme Court "incidentally" held to the contrary in Harshman v. Bates County; but never was it expressly construed or
impliedly, on tis point, in any case by the Supreme Court of
Missouri.
The cases in 37 Mlo. 270, and 38 Mo. 450, have already been
referred to and disposed of by the case of State v. Sutterfield,
54 Mo. 391, which has just been presented somewhat at length.
.Ranney v. Baeder, 50 Mo. 600, was an action in trespass against
the sheriff and collector of Cape Girardeau county, who had coerced
the payment of sixty-seven dollars from the plaintiff, being the
amount of a special tax levied on his real estate in Qape Girardeau
township, to pay off the accruing interest on certain railroad bonds
issued by the county on behalf of the township. It was claimed
the bonds were issued without authority of law, on the ground that
no particular road was designated, either in the petition (for the
ordering an election) or in the order of the court. (No objection
was made to the law or to the election held under it; for it appeared
that out of 383 votes cast 376 were for and 7 against the subscription.) The court held that the road was sufficiently designated,
and that the sheriff was not liable in trespass.
.illh;PiL v. Pen, 51 Mo. 63, was similar to the above in its subVOL. XXVI.-28
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stantial -facts, except that the subscription was to a plank road
company, and that the sheriff was enjoined from selling under his
levy instead of being sued in trespass. The equity for injunction
wa§ based on two grounds. 1st, that the proceedings under which
the stock was subscribed were so irregular as to vitiate the assessment of the tax in this.: that the order for the special election, made
by the county court, provided for no notice of the election and that
no sufficient notice was in fact given. 2d, that the collector had
no right to collect it by levy upon real estate. It appearing in
evidence that a proper notice was not directed by the order, or
given as required in the general election law, the court held the
subscription illegal because of notice of election not beinggiven,
and also sustained the point as to levy on real estate and made the
injunction perpetual. But this case is certainly not relevant to the
point in controversy here.
State v. Cunningham, 51 Mo. 479, was an indictment for stealing
a railroad bond issued by a county for and on behalf of a township
of said county, alleged in the indictment to be the property of the
county. It was moved to quash the indictment because the b6nd
was not the property of the county as appeared from the face of the
bond and indictment. The court held, that the county might be
the owner of it for the purposes of the indictment, and whether so
or not would depend upon facts to be developed at the trial, and
reversed the judgment of the lower court which sustained the motion
to quash.
State v. Sanderson, 54 Mo. 203, really decides nothing, since it
was dismissed for want of proper parties. Some constitutional
objections were suggested (but not the inconsistency of the Act of
1868, Township Aid Act, with the constitution), but none of them
was passed upon by the court.
.Rubey/v. Shan, 54 Mo. 207. This was a suit against the collector
of Macon county to recover back $50 paid by plaintiff.on an assessment against his property%levied by the county court to pay a subscription to a railroad company by the township of Hudson in said
Macon county. It appeared in evidence that the railroad company
was not organited at the time of the subscription. The court held,
that the legislature limits the power to subscribe "to railroad companies duly organized under some law of this state," and that the
law in this case gave the township no power to subscribe stock to a
corporation which had no existence, and that the subscription ivas
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void. The collector was, however, held not liable on other grounds.
This case decides nothing, except that a subscription cannot be
made to a company not in existence.
State v. County Court Bates County, 57 Mo. 70, only inv6lved
this question: A township in Bates county had voted a subscription
to a railroad company, pursuant to an order of election by the
county court, but before an order of subscription was made by the
said court the road was completed through the township, and the
county court refused to make the subscription, apparently on the
ground that the railroad had been completed without asking for the
subscription and that the law only authorized aid to be given in
building. The*court reversed the judgment of the lower court
(which was in favor of the railroad company) and dismissed the
petition, on the ground that the company were invested with no
legal interest by the result of the election, as no subscription was
made by the county or accepted by the company. There was no
question made or decided as to the constitutionality of the law under
which this election was held, and it was plain there was no liability
under the law even supposing it valid.
State v. 67iarkson, 59 Mo. 149, is substantially the same as 51
Mo. 479, being on an indictment and involving the question of
ownership of bonds, or property in them, by the county.
State v. Daviems County Court, 64 Mo. 31, decided but a single
point, whether the non-compliance with certain conditions upon which
the subscription was based affected the rights and liabilities of either
party. The court held the conditions to be the basis of the subscription, and as it was admitted they had not been complied with,
the county was not bound to make the subscription. This, like the
case in 57 Mo. 70, did not involve the consideration of the statute,
since the contract itself was violated upon which the contemplated
subscription was based.
State v. County Court Cooper County, 64 Mo. 170, was an
application directly to the Supreme Court for mandamus to compel
the county court to pay interest on township bonds issued to i railroad company. Without examining the merits of the application
the court denied the writ on the ground that th6 trial courts were
open to the parties, and to grant this would give an advantage
and privity in point of time on the docket to which the applicants
were not entitled.
It thus plainly appears from this review of the cases that in no
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one of them was the question decided in Cass County v. Johnson,
even "incidentally" involved. But it is claimed that State v. Linn
County Court, 44 Mo. 504, decides the precise point or at least
that it is necessarily involved in the decision. Let us see briefly
what this case is: A township of Linn county (it is alleged) peti*tioned the county court to order an election for a vote on a subscription to a railroad company upon certain terms and conditions.
The order was made and the election was held, and more than twothirds of the qualified voters of the township voting at the eZection,
voted for the subscription, and the court made the subscription
pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in the petition.
Subsequently the railroad company requested the court to issue and
deliver the bonds under the terms and conditions of said subscription. The court refused to deliver the bonds, for the reason that
the act under which the subscription was made (Township Aid Act
of 1868) was unconstitutional and void upon the following grounds:1. Because the bonds which it sought to compel the county to
issue under the provisions of the act would be an indebtedness of
the county and not of the township, and that it is, therefore, in
direct antagoiism with section 14, art. 11 of the state constitution,
which declares: "The General Assembly shall not authorize any
county, city or town to become a stockholder in, or loan its credit
to any company, association or corporation unless two-thirds of the
qualified voters of such county, city.or town, at a regular or special
election to be held therein, shall assent thereto."
2. That the act is unconstitutional for the reason that, in providing
for the payment of the principal and interest on such bonds as may
be issued, it requires that real estate only shall be taxed, thereby
exempting all other species of property, for which reason it is in
viblation of the 11th article of the constitution, which declares
"N o property, xeal or personal, shall be exempt from such taxation except such as may be used exclusively for public schools, and
such as may belong to the United States, to this state, to counties,
or to- municipal corporations within the state." The court held
that the act was not in violation of the constitution upon either of
these grounds. No other objection to the act was made or suggested by the pleadings or on the trial, and the case is an authority
only upon these points. It is not denied that the court might
itself have declared the law unconstitutional on other grounds
without regarding the fact that such other grounds were not urged
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(as the Supreme Court of the United States did in the case of
f-arshyman v. Bates County), but it did not do so, either expressly
or impliedly. But it can hardly be said that because the court
overruled the constitutional objections made, that therefore it considered and anticipated all possible constitutional objections and
overruled them ; nor is it usual for courts to say that a particular
statutory provision is constitutional, that is not questioned.
It is therefore palpable that the question of the provision as
to qualified voters, being in conformity with the constitution, was
neither made, considered, decided, or even thought of in this case,
and that the case is not even relevant as an authority in support
of the decision in Cass County v. Johnson.
It has thus been shown (as we think) that the Supreme Court of
the United States has not been consistent in these decisions with
itself, and in Cass (otunty v. Johnson has not been consistent with
the Missouri decisions which it professes to follow.
The attempt at criticism of a court so eminent, and whose decisions are entitled not only to respect but reverence, ordinarily, may
be considered the more pardonable if not entirely justifiable, in
view of the fact that in this case the provision of the state constitution is practically subverted by indirect means, under the plea
(shown to be without foundation) of being bound by the state
decisions. And inasmuch as this court has, by its decisions in
these railroad bond cases, virtually cut off all defence except such
as arises out of the want of power, and even as to these has gone
to the verge of the line attempted to be made by constitutional and
statutory restriction-as for instance, by holding that where the
power to issue bonds is given upon a condition that the public
officers can bind the county or municipality by the false recitals in
such unauthorized bonds, if issued by the officers intrusted by the
statute or constitution with the power (16 Wall. 644), and that the
purchaser may implicitly rely upon the recital in the bonds made
by the proper officer that the authority to issue them has arisen,
and that he is under no obligation to consult the record, and is not
charged with constructive notice of their contents (Marcy v. Township Oswego, 3 Central Law Journal 389)-such views have provoked the powerful dissent of such members of the court as MILLER,
DAVIS, FIELD

and BRADLEY, and evoked urgent and pointed remon-

strance from so conservative a mind as Judge DILLON'S, whose
opinion is well regarded as equal in weight to judicial decision.

